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ABSTRACT 
 
The most recent extremist group in Nigeria, Boko Haram, continues to grow, committing 
various extremist acts, such as sporadic suicide bombings and killing of innocent citizens 
and foreigners within the country.  The current history of Nigeria is a combustible mix of 
violent extremism and thriving homegrown insurgencies.  Rather than internally tackling 
the challenge, the Nigerian government perpetually seeks international interventions to 
assist with the rising crisis.  The fabric of Nigeria’s unity appears to be ripped by violent-
extremism and homegrown insurgency.  The missing link here is a clear focus on tackling 
the prevailing domestic factors that persistently fan the flames of extremism and 
insurgency in Nigeria.   
This thesis examines the contextual factors that are indispensable in explaining the causes 
of violence in Nigeria and unravels the dominant factor driving violent extremism and 
insurgency in Nigeria.  Specifically, it also provides a better understanding of the 
dominant insurgent groupthe Boko Haram sectand the effects of violence and 
insurgency on the oneness of the Nigerian State. It also suggests possible solutions which 
include traditional conflict resolution approaches to curb the menace of violent-
extremism and insurgency in Nigeria.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite the Nigerian government escalating military actions against the Boko 
Haram sect in Northern Nigeria, violent extremism and insurgency show no lasting sign 
of decline within the country.  The most recent extremist group, Boko Haram, continues 
to expand and commit violent acts, such as sporadic suicide bombings and killing of 
innocent citizens and foreigners within the country.  The current history of Nigeria is a 
combustible mix of violent extremism, and thriving homegrown insurgencies.  Rather 
than internally tackling the challenge, the Nigerian government perpetually seeks 
international interventions to assist with the rising crisis.  To merit the attention of the 
international community, the government often restricts its level of analysis to the state 
level and the dangers and threats extremist groups pose to the country and its allies.  For 
example, the Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan, at the 2013 World Economic 
Forum in Davos, Switzerland noted, “if violent extremism is not contained in Nigeria, 
definitely it will spill into other countries in West Africa. . . . This is one of the reasons 
we have to move fast”
 
 (Maylie, 2013, p. 1).  “Moving fast” in the words of President 
Jonathan, largely ignores a well-defined means of ending the crisis in Africa’s most 
populous country. 
The spate of brutal killings and the numerous threats by violent extremist groups, 
particularly the Boko Haram sect, have called into question lasting peace and safety 
within the country for Nigerians and foreigners.  Many Nigerians are now forced to live 
in fear, as they are subjected to unprecedented levels of chaos and havoc, which include 
indiscriminate bombings and killings, such as the country never witnessed before, even 
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during the 1967-1970 civil war.  Hill (2012) attributed the Boko Haram scourge to 
Nigeria’s state failure.  Violent-extremism and homegrown insurgency appear to be 
ripping the fabric of Nigeria’s unity.  Insurgent groups have made several daring attempts 
to impose religious ideology forcefully, such as the practice of Sharia law on Nigeria’s 
secular state.  Despite the deployment of troops into the Northern states of Nigeria to 
tackle rising insurgency in Nigeria, the Boko Haram sect seems more resilient than ever, 
simply because the Nigerian government appears incapable of curbing the menace 
affecting the lives of its citizens. 
Among notable Nigerians who have shown concern over the indiscriminate 
bombings and killings in Northern Nigeria by Boko Haram is the Nobel-winning author, 
Wole Soyinka.  Soyinka struck a pessimistic note in 2010 by admitting that he did not 
rule out Nigeria breaking up, as that is what can happen to a failed state, one that has lost 
control over the majority of its territory (Howden, 2010).  According to the Fund for 
Peace (2012), Nigeria is referred to as a failed state due to corruption and criminal 
activities occurring in the country as well as the inability of government to provide public 
services to its citizens.  Nigeria’s weak central government is closely bound to the 
existence and activities of insurgent groups, such as Boko Haram, that have defied all 
governmental approach to ending violence and mayhem in Nigeria.  It is clear that the 
Nigerian government is deficient in exercising authority over parts of Nigeria, 
particularly in the northern and central regions where Boko Haram carries out its 
nefarious activities without exemption. 
 
 
3 
Statement of the Problem 
Insurgent groups, particularly the Boko Haram sect, threatens the very existence 
of Nigerian unity and have aided in creating the vicious cycle of fear, thereby exposing 
the Federal government’s failure to exercise control.  Despite the Nigerian government’s 
declaration of a state of emergency in the three most affected northern states, namely 
Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe, respectively, violence has continued with no sign of abating 
in Northern Nigeria.  In recent times, the Nigerian government has deployed over 8,000 
soldiers to combat insurgents in these affected states, but the absence of a specific 
Military Code of Justice to clearly identify intended targets and protect the civilian 
population has further increased the number of casualties in Northern Nigeria.  For 
example, the Nigerian Army conducted a single deadly military intervention that caused 
wanton destruction of lives and properties of civilians in Baga, Borno State in 
northeastern Nigeria, on Sunday, April 21, 2013.  The soldiers from the special 
operations team invaded the Baga community in Northern Nigeria to search for suspects 
believed to be members of the deadly extremist Islamic group Boko Haram and killed 
over 200 civilians in one day (Akande, 2013).  It is evident that the Nigerian government 
lacks a clear program for dealing with the challenge of violent-extremism and 
insurgency.  The missing link here is a clear focus on tackling the prevailing domestic 
factors that persistently fan the flames of extremism and insurgency in Nigeria. 
Scholars have linked a number of factors, including endemic poverty, widespread 
corruption, weak state structure, social frustration, and mismanagement of resource 
endowment, as contributing to the scale of violent extremism and insurgency in Nigeria.  
This thesis examines the contextual factors that are salient in explaining the causes of 
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violence in Nigeria.  Hill (2012) argued that Nigeria is a failed state because its writ of 
government does not extend to all areas within its boundary, and the federal government 
does not promote sustainable legal institutions.  Other scholars have linked rising 
insurgent groups and extremism in the country to socioeconomic conditions, such as 
extreme poverty in the affected region of northern Nigeria, endemic corruption, 
mismanagement of the country’s oil wealth, and weak political institutions.  Whetho an 
Uzodike (2011) suggested that social frustration and aggression has triggered violent 
extremism and insurgency in Nigeria, especially in the northern part of the country.   
Despite the ongoing debate over the major causes of violence and insurgency in 
Nigeria, this thesis will unravel the dominant factors driving violent extremism and 
insurgency in Nigeria.  In explaining intrastate violence in Nigeria, three theories are 
examined in the Nigerian context.  First is the resource curse (Bannon & Collier, 2003; 
Collier & Hoefller, 1998; LeBillon 2005).  Second is the failed state argument (Rotberg, 
2002, 2003; Zartman, 1995) and, finally, the frustration-aggression theory (Dollard, J., 
Doob, L., Miller, N., Mowrer, O.H, & Sears, R., 1993; Gurr, 1970, 2000).  In order to test 
these key theories (assumptions for the violence), this study compares the northern (non-
oil producing) and southern (oil producing) regions of Nigeria and analyzes the pattern 
and trend of violence in the country.  In addition, the study draws comparison between 
other peaceful regions in Nigeria and the violent ridden region of northern Nigeria.   
Hypotheses 
The main hypothesis for the resource curse is H1: Regions with greater resource 
extraction, such as oil, will experience higher levels of violent-extremism and insurgency.  
Thus, the research question: Is oil extraction the leading factor that promotes violent-
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extremism and insurgency in most parts of Nigeria? The second hypothesis is the failed 
state.  H2: Regions where the central government does not have the capacity to 
effectively police the regions and provide public services will experience higher levels of 
violent-extremism and insurgency.  The second research question: Are weak central 
institutions the leading factor that promotes violent-extremism and insurgency in most 
parts of Nigeria?  Finally, the frustration-aggression theory is based on socioeconomic 
factors and relative deprivation.  H3: Regions with higher levels of abject poverty will 
experience higher levels of violent-extremism and insurgency.  The third research 
question: Is the gap between the rich and poor leading to social frustration the leading 
factor that promotes violent-extremism and insurgency in most parts of Nigeria? 
The purpose of this study is four-fold.  First is to determine the leading factor that 
most fans the flames of violent-extremism and insurgency in Nigeria.  Second is to 
compare peace in other regions of Nigeria with the affected northern region of Nigeria.  
Third is to understand insurgent groups better, particularly the Boko Haram sect, and the 
effects of violence and insurgency on the unity of the Nigerian State.  Last, the study 
recommends possible means of combating violent extremism in Nigeria. 
Significance of the Study and General Outline 
Due to its large population, rich cultural diversity, and growing economy, Nigeria 
is considered to be a powerful regional influence in sub-Saharan Africa, and a reliable 
ally for the success of American foreign policy and interests in Africa (Minabere, 2013).  
Findings from this study contribute to the literature on counter-insurgency.  In addition, 
this study identifies measures and possible solutions for the Nigerian government that can 
bring lasting peace and unity to the country.  A wide variety of audiences may be 
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interested in this research, particularly students who are interested in peace and conflict 
studies.  Other academic disciplines that could be enriched by this research include 
history, political science, international and globalization studies, and military and security 
studies. 
The analyses and research are formulated in the following chapters.  Chapter Two 
defines violent-extremism and insurgency, with a brief overview of the history of Nigeria 
in its pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial eras.  It also discusses the key variables and 
the relevant theories that explain violent extremism and insurgency in Nigeria.  Chapter 
Three reviews the activities of the extremist groups, their expressed goals, interests, 
membership, support, and the types of violence committed by these groups.  
Consideration is also given to the changing dynamics of these extremist groups and the 
factors that contribute to the exponential rise of extremist groups in Nigeria.  Chapter 
Four tests the hypotheses to ascertain the relevance of theories to factors that persistently 
fan the flames of violent extremism in Nigeria.  It also includes a critique of resource 
curse theory and the general linkage of natural resources to violence.  Chapter Five 
concludes with policy recommendations and suggestions for further research. Chapter Six 
provides a social media perspective from the country’s view and international view of 
Boko Haram.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
DEFINITIONS AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
What is violent extremism and insurgency?  The Resilient Communities of 
Australia (2013), the Australian government’s community-based initiative on fighting 
violent extremism, defined violent extremism “as the beliefs and actions of people who 
support or use violence to achieve ideological, religious or political goals” (para. 1).  All 
forms of violent extremism include terrorism, communal violence, and other forms of 
politically motivated violence.  Also, the U.S. Counter-Insurgency Initiative (2009) has 
defined insurgency as: 
the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge 
political control of a region. Insurgents seek to subvert or displace the government 
and completely or partially control the resources and population of a given 
territory.  They do so through the use of force (including guerrilla warfare, 
terrorism, and coercion/intimidation), propaganda, subversion, and political 
mobilization.  Insurgents fight government forces only to the extent needed to 
achieve their political aims: their main effort is not to kill counterinsurgents, but 
rather to establish a competitive system of control over the population, making it 
impossible for the government to administer its territory and people.  Insurgent 
activity, therefore, is designed to weaken government control and legitimacy 
while increasing insurgent control and influence. (6) 
 
According to Price and Morris (2011), “social scientists and policy makers alike 
repeatedly have underestimated the power of ideologies and deeply felt convictions as 
primary motivations behind numerous forms of violent extremism” (p. 21).  In order to 
understand what truly drives militants into violent extremist groups, one needs to identify 
their motivations.  Violent extremist groups are moved by self-interest, narrow 
grievances, the search for power or wealth, or the desire to advance a political agenda, as 
this certainly spurs them into violence (Price & Morris, 2011).  In many cases, what 
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brings violent extremists together is their shared dedication to a particular vision of how 
society ought to be organized, and/or their strong questioning of the foundations upon 
which their societies are presently organized.  Price and Morris (2011) explained that  
this is true of many Salafi Jihadist groups today, just as it was true–in radically 
different contexts and on the basis of entirely different world viewsof the left 
wing radical groups of the 1970s in West Germany (the Red Army Faction or 
Baader-Meinhoff Gang), Italy (the Red Brigades), and Japan (the Japanese Red 
Army). (23)  
 
As such, the Boko Haram of Northern Nigeria is equally held by their belief in the 
imposition and practice of Sharia law in Nigeria.   
In addition, firmly held religious or political beliefs play a critical role and need to 
be part of the analysis.  For example, committed extremists or “true believers” tend to 
persist in the face of overwhelming odds.  Though they are forward-looking in their 
plans, they strongly pursue inordinate objectives that may not be achieved during their 
lifetime.  In other words, “their propensity to continue to fightdespite their realization 
that they will not experience the future political/social outcomeis greatly enhanced by 
adherence to transcendental values that trump self- interest, realpolitik, or cost benefit 
calculations” (Price & Morris, 2011, p. 23). 
What is the moral justification for violence?  Price and Morris (2011) argued that 
values and beliefs also matter to the extent that they can provide moral justifications for 
violence.  In the USAID, Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism (2009) states, 
The perceived presence of a compelling moral imperative often is required for 
individuals to convince themselves that it is acceptable–indeed, as they view it, 
necessaryto resort to cruelty towards others.  It is not enough merely to focus on 
the presumed pressures or incentives created by the social, economic, and 
political environment in which violent extremists operate if one is to account for 
moral justification for violence.  It is pertinent to take longstanding and recently 
forged norms and worldviews into consideration as well. (12)  
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According to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID, 
2009), “violent extremists often are driven, in part, by culture based and culture specific 
perceptions of what is fair and unfair, just and unjust” (p. 12).  Violent extremists’ 
motivations are usually derived from some basic social contracts between the state and 
citizens, and their view presumes that a breach of this contract justifies the use of 
violence. Perceptions of whether or not “underlying conditions justify the resort to 
violence often are far more decisive than those conditions themselves, and these 
perceptions do not develop in a vacuum; instead, they are strongly influenced by the 
prevailing cultural and ideological setting in which they emerge” (Price & Morris, 2011, 
p. 24). 
In recent years, social scientists have provided useful concepts to simplify and 
analyze extremists.  For example, some academics suggested individuals driven to violent 
extremism do so because of mere ideological fervor or zeal (USAID, 2009).  It is 
imperative to note that religion or ideology usually conceals other struggles that are 
motivated by power or resource control.  “Scholars justifiably have highlighted the role 
of grievances, greed, contextual socioeconomic and political factors, and group dynamics 
in driving many manifestations of violent extremism” (Price & Morris, 2011).  At the 
same time, however, one also must recognize that, for Nigeria’s Boko Haram, the rage at 
the government embodies an order rooted in Sharia law, moral relativism, and punishing 
other people that are deemed un-Islamic. 
Furthermore, the roles of religious beliefs in explaining violent extremism cannot 
be understated. Though religious beliefs have been identified to be the root cause of 
violence in some societies, but there are other causes of discontent that are unrelated to 
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religious beliefs. Juergensmeyer (2008) argued that there is an additional layer of 
complexity which religion can add to even conflicts that are primarily about competition 
over territory, power and/or resources.  In such contexts, religion may not be the root 
cause of discontent; instead, it initially may be primarily a way through which grievances 
are expressed and individuals mobilized” (p. 13). 
Historical Development of Violence in Nigeria 
Many scholars have examined the political history of Nigeria to explain the 
present predicament of the nation.  This section first addresses how violence and 
extremism evolved with Nigeria’s history.  Sir Frederick Lugard’s forceful amalgamation 
of Northern and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria on January 1, 1914, is generally 
regarded as the birthdate of the Nigerian state.   
What existed in the period before the establishment of colonial rule was a motley 
of diverse groups whose histories and interactions, interlaced as they were by 
external influences had nevertheless crystallized in three clearly discernible 
regional formations by the end of the 19th century. (Osaghae, 1998, p. 2) 
 
As a matter of fact, there was no political entity called “Nigeria.”  “Flora Shaw, who later 
married Lord Frederick Lugard in June 1902, was the first to propose the name ‘Nigeria’ 
in an essay published in The Times on January 8, 1897” (Hill, 2012, p. 128).  Lugard later 
“served as High Commissioner of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria from its creation 
in January 1, 1900 until November 1906.  He was later Governor-General of the Colony 
and Protectorate of Nigeria from January 1, 1914 to August 8, 1919” (Falola, 2009, p. 
30).   
According to Toyin Falola (2009), a renowned professor of African history at the 
University of Texas at Austin, “colonization was achieved in Nigeria either by the use of 
war or by surrender because of the threat of war, and the imposition of colonial rule by 
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the British government created conditions for violence in Nigeria from the beginning of 
the nineteenth century to the early 1950’s” (p. 1).  British economic and political interests 
created the violent confrontations that led to the colonization of Nigeria.  The purpose of 
their conquest was to inaugurate imperial control.  The Royal Niger Company (1879-
1900), a mercantile company chartered by the British government, had indicated that 
“colonial domination would be accompanied by exploitation and violence, including the 
excessive use of power and violence to pursue narrow economic objectives and transfer 
of wealth outside of Nigeria” (Falola, 2009, p. 6).  According to Hill (2012), “Colonial 
rule did so much to perpetuate and extend divisions between a bewildering array of ethnic 
groups in Nigeria” (p. 1).  The advancement of commercial interests began as early as the 
mid-nineteenth century, when the British sent troops and gunboats to the lower Niger for 
conquest.  Later on, economic interests broadened into larger interests of imperialism, 
which had to be established by force. 
Falola explained that British violence occurred in two stages.  The first stage used 
force to conquer or the threat of force to obtain voluntary surrender.  “Force” here 
involved terrorizing kings and their subjects.  These wars marked the end of independent 
and autonomous indigenous nations and groups.  In the second stage, the British 
colonized the people through territorial governance.  This involved the physical presence 
of police and the army.  The British government regarded the use of force as legitimate 
and interpreted military success as a justification for imposing political authority.  The 
British considered their need to impose imperial rule as a sufficient justification for the 
use of violence. 
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Before their invasion, the British government had surveyed the landscape of 
Nigeria and gathered useful information about people and places before they launched 
their attacks on Nigerians.  The British attacked Ijebu-Ode in May 1892 and later invaded 
Ibadan in southwestern Nigeria in 1895 (Johnson, 1921).  In 1898, the British established 
the West African Frontier Force (WAFF) with headquarters in Lokoja.  Their goal was to 
conquer and control the peoples and nations located in the region.  On Jan 1, 1900, 
Frederick Lugard hoisted the British flag at Lokoja, declaring a British Protectorate with 
himself as the first colonial officer to head the new colonial government. 
Lugard, who served as the first high commissioner of Northern Nigeria from 1900 
to 1906 was ruthless in the conquest of what became Northern Nigeria, and was fanatical 
in pursuit of the principles of indirect rule.  Despite the violent resistance of the 
indigenous peoples, Lugard was able to use the more powerful British forces to 
overpower and subdue the areas (Falola, 2012).  His views on the establishment of 
dominant colonial power were emphatic.  Historians described Lugard as a trained soldier 
who wasted no time in moving against many emirates in northern Nigeria.  He believed 
that, for his small wars to succeed, he had to ignore the Colonial Office in London, which 
he adjudged as timid, too concerned with public opinion in Britain, and too sensitive to 
the larger international politics of Europe.  Lugard used force against the emirates of 
Kano, Sokoto, and Katsina between 1902 and 1903 (Falola, 2009).   
Lugard replaced the traditional kings with his own, usually rivals of old.  He 
strongly held that civilization of Africans would come only through violence and 
authoritarianism.  Without force and violence, slavery and alcoholism and other vices 
would not disappear.  In Lugard’s views, the government should not be slow in taking 
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punitive measures when necessary (Osaghae, 1998).  While violence created Northern 
Nigeria, the politics of indirect rule consolidated the colonial administration.  Lugard was 
astute in his definition of indirect rule.  Lugard placed the Fulani emirs in power, using 
their established indigenous political institutions to govern.  Though he neither respected 
them nor found them worthy political leaders, this system saved money and avoided 
organized rebellions against alien rule.  As long as the emirs established a chain of 
authority between him and their subjects, with him as the leader, they were doing their 
job (Osaghae, 1998).  He used the emirs as powerful authorities to collect taxes and run 
other important errands for the colonial administration.  As Lugard extended his ideas of 
indirect rule to the south, he began a process that altered the basis of traditional power 
and generated conflicts and riots in a number of areas (Falola, 2009).   
Many Nigerian groups understood the aims of British imperialism and resisted 
through wars and by other means.  The majority of the traditional rulers knew that British 
conquest would bring about a loss of power for them.  Though the invading British troops 
had superior firepower and technology, this did not prevent various indigenous pressure 
groups from using locally made guns, rifles, and flintlocks to fight for their freedom and 
independence.  Ad-hoc Nigerian armies sprang up from numerous tribes and lands and 
used spears, bows and arrows, and machetes against the more tyrannous and powerful 
British invaders with powerful Maxim and Gatling guns.  The very essence of Nigerians’ 
war of resistance against the British troop decisively shaped some of the actions of the 
British that followed in later years (Falola, 2009).  Nigerians had to fight when the 
colonial invaders began to take actions.  Falola contended that “to dismiss the wars of 
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resistance fought by Nigerians is to fall into a big trap: that of the failure to understand 
the complex roles of violence in Anglo-Nigerian relations” (Falola, 2009, p. 15). 
Thus, Nigeria became a British colonial creation through a piecemeal and 
combined process of trade, monopoly, military superiority, “divide and rule,” and 
outright conquest.  The various groups were brought together under the aegis of colonial 
authority (Osaghae, 1998).  The forceful amalgamation of both southern and northern 
Nigeria had far-reaching implications for the Nigerian state and nation building.  British 
acquisition of territories in Nigeria had three different strands, which roughly 
approximated to the regional formations of Western protectorate, Eastern protectorate, 
and Northern protectorate.  According to Osaghae (1998), the question of how to 
structure and administer the colony and protectorates of the future Nigeria led to the 
setting up of northern and southern provinces.  The Niger Delta protectorate became the 
Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria in 1906, which existed alongside the 
Protectorate of Northern Nigeria until the amalgamation of the two territories in 1914.  
With amalgamation  
came the partial abolition of customs frontiers existing between the two countries, 
the unification of the railway system, adoption of a standard currency, 
universalization and systematization of taxation, a unified judicial system and 
integrated bureaucracy, extension of indirect rule to the south, the abolition of 
separate northern and southern regiments, and the adoption of a uniform time of 
71/20 meridian and single weekly gazette. (Ngou, 1989, p. 9) 
 
In spite of these changes, Northern and Southern Nigeria continued to develop 
along different lines, with British administrators employing different administrative 
methods in Northern and Southern Nigeria.  Osaghae (1998) explained that “most parts of 
the North were shielded from Western influences, especially education and Christian 
missionary activities, in accordance with a pact Lugard was said to have signed with the 
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emirs, they were allowed to free reign in the South” (p. 33).  This gave a head start to 
Southern groups not only in education but also in political development.  The gap 
between Northern and Southern Nigeria was huge, because most of the schools in the 
country, during the colonial era, were established by Christian missions.  North-South 
dichotomy was not the only structural flaw of colonial rule that had grave consequences 
for post-independence Nigeria.  Regionalism, tribalism, ethnic divide, and the geographic 
concentration of the country’s economic development in the south all contributed to the 
uneven nature of progress between the Northern and Southern states of Nigeria (Osaghe, 
1998).   
The British diarchy of a relatively weak central authority and greater autonomy in 
Nigeria contributed to the colonial legacy of weak central institutions and relatively 
strong regional and local ethnic authorities.  This not only hindered nationalism and 
unification of the country but also planted the seeds of regional discord and even violent 
extremism.  The divide-and-rule nature of the colonial period did not allow institution 
building at the central level.  Thus, tribalism and ethnic conflict were unable to be 
resolved through legal and institutional means.  Instead, regional disputes were resolved 
through traditional (peaceful) mediation or violence. 
Since the colonial era, the limited central capacity to regulate and mediate 
political power and territorial control institutionally has meant that violence has remained 
integral to modern Nigeria.  The British wars of conquests were, for the Nigerians, wars 
of resistance.  This struggle continued until October 1, 1960, when Nigeria gained 
independence from the British government.  Thus, “violence serves political purposes in 
Nigeria: to dominate, to resist domination, to create conditions for negotiation, and to 
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target people and objects that symbolize oppression” (Falola, 2009, p. 9).  Colonization 
led to the intentional establishment of weak state institution, as the British administration 
focused on economic exploitation at the expense of nation-building in Nigeria. The 
divide and rule policy of British led to the intentional creation of a weak central authority 
in Nigeria.  
Upon Nigeria’s independence on October 1, 1960, the British deliberately handed 
over a disempowered Nigerian state over to a weak central government, composed of 
clearly distinguishable ethnic groups, in order to ensure further exploitation of a 
beleaguered country.  The post-independence civil war in Nigeria between1967-1970 
became illustrative of the weak institutions left behind by the colonial masters that could 
not coherently sustain the unity of the ethnically-diverse Nigerian state. Good enough, the 
Nigerian state was able to survive the  bloody civil war which was the first test on 
Nigeria’s unity, yet successive administrations in Nigeria largely ignored thorough 
reforms of these weak state institutions left behind by the British. Given the role of 
violence and insurgency in Nigeria’s history, it is unsurprising that extremist groups such 
as Boko Haram have appropriated these actions to overthrow the existing government. 
Theoretical Approaches 
Scholars have developed many theories to explain the scale of interstate violence.  
Notable among these theories are: (a) state-failure (Rotberg, 2002, 2003); (b) frustration-
aggression and relative deprivation (Dollard et al., 1939; Gurr, 1970, 2000; Zartman, 
1995); and (c) resource curse (Bannon & Collier, 2003; Collier, 2003; Collier & Hoefller, 
1998; Le Billon, 2005).  These three approaches operationalize the causes of violence and 
extremism, as they explain whether or not the factors identified correlate with occurrence 
 
 
17 
of violence in Nigeria.  First, the state-failure concept frames the absence of 
government’s control over the length and breadth of its territory through the lenses of 
state incapacity.  Second, the frustration-aggression theory accounts for the motivation 
that gravitates disgruntled, aggrieved, and frustrated Nigerian citizens toward terrorism.  
Third, the resource-curse theory provides a link between resource endowment and the 
occurrence of violence. 
Beginning with the state-failure thesis, Hill (2012) argued that Nigeria is a failed 
state for two main reasons.  First, the central government does not run the length and 
breadth of its territory.  There are places within Nigeria that the Federal government does 
not have firm control due to the overwhelming activities of extremists.  For example, the 
creeks in the Niger Delta region and the northeastern city of Maiduguri lie beyond the 
direct and continuous control of the federal, state, and local governments due to the 
activities of dominant insurgent groups.  These areas are controlled by a range of 
insurgent groups, such as Boko Haram and Ansaru in the northeast and, in the Niger 
Delta, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Niger Delta 
Vigilante Force (NDVF), and the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF). 
Second, Hill (2012) further argued that “the Nigerian government does not 
provide Nigerians with the public goods or social services they have a reasonable right to 
expect such as law and order, basic healthcare, at least primary education, and impartial 
justice (p. 2).”  Hill contended that the inability of the Nigeria state to provide citizens 
with these services has not only compromised the quality of life of millions of Nigerians 
today but also it is denying them crucial opportunities to improve their wealth and that of 
generations to come. 
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Adibe (2012a) argued that frustration due to factors such as severe poverty, 
unemployment, and elite corruption causes aggression within the affected masses.  
Citizens who feel alienated, frustrated, and abandoned either find refuge in their religious 
groups or are manipulated to wage insurgency against the state (Adibe, 2012b).  Another 
argument within the frustration-aggression theory is that the reintroduction of the Sharia 
law by the federal government of Nigeria in the 12 northern states resulted in widespread 
disillusionment at the way it was implemented, and members of the sect simply tapped 
into that frustration (Adibe 2012a).  Other Nigerians believed that Boko Haram 
represents the majority of unprivileged Nigerians who are being deprived of 
socioeconomic amenities such as schools, hospitals, and good roads.   
According to Rotberg (2003), nation states fail because they are convulsed by 
internal violence and, as a result, are unable to provide security and positive political 
goods to their citizens.  These political goods include security, education, healthcare, 
infrastructures, employment opportunities, and a legal framework for law and order 
(Rotberg, 2002).  Once the state breaches the obligations it has to its citizens, it loses 
legitimacy to insurgents whose main ambition is to overthrow an existing government 
using a variety of violent and non-violent tactics to gain the support of the aggrieved 
citizens.  Unfortunately, the lack of services and security has led to the rise of extremist 
groups in different parts of north Nigeria.  Furthermore, conflict theories have shown that 
when a group’s shared grievances about marginalization are combined with a strong 
sense of group identity, there is a tendency for the outburst of violent responses against 
the source of their marginalization, either real or imagined (Gurr, 1994).  This situation 
well applies to the Boko Haram sect’s undertaking in Nigeria. 
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Although there appears to be some correlation between increased frustration and 
disillusionment and the escalation of violence, much of the violence is associated with 
growing regional and religious fanaticism in Northern Nigeria.  Nigeria’s extremist 
Islamist group, Boko Haram, is causing havoc in Africa’s most populous country and is 
fighting to overthrow the government and create an Islamic state through a coordinated 
wave of bombings.  The Boko Haram sect has developed within the power vacuum in 
northern Nigeria and is connected with the colonial legacy of a weak central authority 
and more autonomous regions. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
EXTREMIST GROUPS AND EXPRESSED GOALS 
Boko Haram was born out of the regional violence and tension between Northern 
Nigeria and the central authority.  The weak central capacity to mediate conflict in this 
region has brought about the existence of Boko Haram.  Thus, it is important to examine 
the development and stated goals of the group.  Over the past decade, the Boko Haram 
sect has persistently challenged and threatened the fragile unity of Nigeria.  Boko Haram, 
loosely translated from the local Hausa language, means “Western education is 
forbidden.”  Its followers are influenced by the Koranic phrase that says, “anyone who is 
not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors,” (Chothia, 2012, 
para. 1).  Boko Haram promotes a version of Islam that makes it “haram” or forbidden for 
Muslims to take part in political or social activity associated with Western society.  
Several forbidden activities include voting in elections, wearing shirts and trousers, or 
receiving secular education (Chothia, 2012).   
Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf, a charismatic Muslim cleric founded Boko Haram in 
2002 in Maiduguri, the capital city of the Borno state in northeastern Nigeria.  The sect’s 
philosophy is rooted in the practice of orthodox Islam and the group’s official name in 
Arabic is Jama’atu Ahlissunah lidda’awati wal Jihad, which translates in English to, 
“people committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and Jihad” (Chothia, 
2012, para. 4).  Boko Haram, along with a splinter group called Ansaru, has a mission to 
overthrow the Nigerian state and impose strict Islamic Sharia Law throughout the entire 
country.  Boko Haram’s mission is to “sanitize the Nigerian system, which is spellbound 
by western education and ideals” (Onuoha, 2012, 136). 
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Boko Haram members are motivated by the conviction that the Nigerian state is 
filled with social depravities, and, thus, “the best thing for a devout Muslim to do was to 
migrate from the morally bankrupt society to a secluded place and establish an ideal 
Islamic society devoid of political corruption and moral deprivation” (Akanji, 2009, p. 
55).  As is common with nearly all insurgent groups, Boko Haram’s expressed goals are 
to overthrow the Nigerian government, incite religious tensions by acts of terror (i.e., 
suicide bombings), and eventually declare an Islamic state in Nigeria. 
Group Structure 
The erstwhile leader of the Boko Haram, Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf, did not 
complete his secondary school education, but later received Koranic education in the 
Chad and Niger republics, where he became radicalized and famous for his radical views 
on Islamic issues expressed on local television stations (Onuoha, 2012).  The Koranic 
schools later became a recruiting ground for Jihadists who would take up arms and fight 
for the emancipation of an Islamic state.  Before his death in 2009, Ustaz Mohammed 
Yusuf, the leader of the Boko Haram sect, had established a structure whereby each state 
had its own Amir (commander or leader), and local government area (which is 
synonymous to a county in the United States).  The Amirs administer the local 
governments and report to their supreme leader.  Below the local government are the 
remaining followers.  Boko Haram organized themselves according to various roles, such 
as soldiers and police, among others (Dawah Coordination Council of Nigeria, 2009).  
Thus, the political vacuum that exists due to little or no impact of a central authority 
necessitates the structural leadership that Boko Haram provides in Northern Nigeria 
(Onuoha, 2012).   
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Group Membership, Support and Resources 
The Boko Haram group draws its members mainly from unemployed youths, 
disaffected youths, and former Almajiris (known as street children), mostly in Northern 
Nigeria.  The term “Almajiri refers to someone who leaves his home in search of 
knowledge in Islamic religion”(Purefoy, 2010, para. 15).  These disaffected youths are 
apparently on the streets of major cities in Northern Nigeria.  They are usually homeless 
and ask for alms from motorists and passersby in major cities.  In addition, it is a popular 
practice whereby children from poor homes are sent to live and study under renowned 
Islamic teachers in cities in Northern Nigeria, such as Kaduna, Kano, Maiduguri, and 
Zaria, among others (Onuoha, 2010).  Boko Haram offers means of livelihood to the 
almajiris and later offers them membership.  These poor  almajiris are exploited by the 
rich elite who are also members and sponsors of the Boko Haram sect. 
Contrary to wide speculation about Boko Haram being faceless, the group has 
known membership and the support of some notable Nigerians including Alhaji Buji Fai, 
an ex-commissioner in Borno State; Kadiru Atiku, a former university lecturer; and Bunu 
Wakil, a Borno-based contractor (Onuoha, 2012).  The Boko Haram group is alleged to 
have over 280,000 members across the 19 states of Northern Nigeria, Niger Republic, 
Chad, and Sudan (Oyegbile & Lawal, 2009). 
It is important to note that, while most members of the Boko Haram sect are poor, 
their also supporters and members of the sect who are not poor.  Boko Haram gets most 
of its funding from the contributions and donations of their affluent members.  Members 
have to pay a daily levy of 100 naira (equivalent of US $0.60) to their leader.  This 
provides the basic source of funding for the group, in addition to donations from 
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politicians, government officials, and other individuals or organizations within Nigeria.  
The sect is also alleged to be receiving funds from outside Nigeria.  Alhaji Bunu Wakil, a 
contractor and an indigene of Borno state, was alleged to be the main financier of the 
Boko Haram sect (Idris, 2011a).  In January 2011, the Nigerian police celebrated what it 
described as a “landmark” achievement when security operatives arrested Alhaji Bunu 
Wakil and 91 other persons for sponsoring terror against the state (Mararna, 2011).  In 
2007, Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf and Mohammed Bello Damagun, a Muslim cleric who 
supposedly belonged to a group dubbed the ‘”Nigerian Taliban,” were tried for terrorism-
related offences.  Mohammed Damagun was arraigned in a federal high court in Abuja on 
three charges: (a) belonging to the Nigerian Taliban, (b) receiving a total of US $300,000 
from al-Qaeda to recruit and train Nigerians in Mauritania for terrorism, and (c) aiding 
terrorists in Nigeria (Onuoha, 2011).  Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf was later arraigned on 
five charges, including receiving money from al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan to recruit 
terrorists who would attack residences of foreigners, especially Americans living in 
Nigeria (Onuoha, 2010a; Suleiman, 2007).  Although Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf was 
arrested in 2008, he and other members of the sect were discharged and later found their 
way back into the Nigerian society. 
Escalating Acts of Extremism in Nigeria 
The escalating level of violence in Nigeria fits the description of a failed state, 
and the central authority’s lack of control to quell the wave of bombings and 
indiscriminate killings by Boko Haram strongly confirms the underlying hypotheses of a 
failed state.  The Boko Haram sect first took up arms against the Nigerian state security 
forces on December 24, 2003 as police stations and public buildings in the towns of Giam 
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and Kanamma in the state of Yobe were attacked (Onuoha, 2012).  The members 
occupied the two buildings for several days, hoisting the flag of the Afghanistan’s 
Taliban movement over the camps.  As a result, a joint operation of soldiers and police 
dislodged the group after killing eighteen and arresting dozen of its members (Suleiman, 
2007).  The nature of Boko Haram’s violence became more worrisome in 2004 when 
students, especially in tertiary institutions in Borno and Yobe states such as the 
University of Maiduguri, withdrew from school, tore up their certificates, and joined the 
group for Koranic lessons and preaching (Lawal, 2009).   
In July 2009, Boko Haram carried out a spate of attacks on police stations and 
other government buildings in Maiduguri.  After the incidents, the Nigerian security 
forces eventually seized the group’s headquarters, capturing its fighters and leader, Ustaz 
Mohammed Yusuf, who was brutally murdered in what appeared to have been an 
extrajudicial killing.  In the aftermath of the incidents, though the state television service 
and security forces declared Boko Haram finished, its fighters regrouped under a new 
leader, Abubakar Shekau, in 2010 and attacked a prison in Bauchi State, freeing hundreds 
of the group’s supporters.  Boko Haram’s trademark has been the use of gunmen on 
motorbikes, killing police, politicians, Muslim and Christian clerics, and anyone who 
criticizes their actions (BBC News, 2012). See Table 1 for a timeline of Boko Haram’s 
alleged attacks and killings.  
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Table 1 
Timeline of Alleged Attacks and Killings by the Boko Haram Group 
Date  Targets Description 
6 October 2010 Maiduguri (Borno 
State) 
Police Sergeant 
NSCDC Corporal 
Both security personnel were attached to the 
speaker of the Borno State House of 
Assembly 
6 October 2010 Maiduguri (Borno 
State) 
Awana Ali Ngala 
(Politician) 
He was the immediate past chairman of the 
All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) in Borno 
State 
6 October 2010 Maiduguri (Borno 
State) 
Mallam Bashir 
Kashara (Islamic 
Cleric) 
He was killed along with one of his 
members 
11 October 2010 Maiduguri (Borno 
State) 
Police Station at 
Gamboru (Borno 
State) 
The sects set the police station ablaze, but 
were overpowered by the police. A member 
of the sect was killed in the attack 
23 October 2010 Bara, Yobe State Police Station at 
Bara 
They attempted to set the station ablaze, but 
were overpowered by the police. A member 
of the sect was killed in the attack 
14 November 2010 Maiduguri (Borno 
State) 
Soldiers at 231 
Battalion 
The soldier was attached to the 231 battalion 
of the Nigerian Army, located in Biu. Also 
shot was his friend who had gone with him 
to a local restaurant to have launch Zannari 
20 November 2010 Maiduguri (Borno 
State) 
Mohammed and 
Salisu 
JibrinPolicemen and 
Soldiers 
They were both killed around Dal bus stop 
while returning from work 
24 December 2010 Maiduguri (Borno 
State) 
Christmas eve 
bombings Several 
Churches in 
Maiduguri and Jos 
At least 86 people were reportedly killed, 
while over 100 were injured during the 
Christmas eve bomb attacks and clashes. 
The Boko Haram claimed responsibility for 
the attacks 
29 December 2010 Maiduguri (Borno 
State) 
8 persons including 
3 policemen were 
killed in five 
separate attacks in 
the city 
The attack occurred near Baga road in 
Ruwan Zafi district of Maiduguri 
(continued) 
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Table 1 
Timeline of Alleged Attacks and Killings by the Boko Haram Group (continued) 
Date  Targets Description 
1 January 2011 Maiduguri (Borno 
State) 
Victory Christ 
Church 
Suspected members of Boko Haram 
attacked the church at Gawo Mai Lamba 
Area of Borno state 
4 January 2011 Yola (Adamawa 
State) 
Prison break at 
Jimeta 
At least 10 prison officials narrowly escaped 
being lynched by members of the sect and 
over 14 inmates were freed. Members of the 
sect were recently transferred from 
Maiduguri Prisons to Jimeta Prison 
May 29 2011 Abuja President 
Goodluck’s 
inauguration day 
Abuja 
Three bombs tore through a beer garden in a 
military barracks in the northern city of 
Bauchi, killing 13 and wounding 33. Boko 
Haram claimed responsibility. 
16 June 2011 Abuja Police Headquarters 
Abuja 
A suicide attacker believed to be member of 
the sect drove a car loaded with Improvised 
explosive devices (IEDS) in to the Police 
headquarters in Abuja. 
20 June, 2011 Kankara  Katsina Bank in Kankara 
Katsina 
Seven people including five policemen 
killed in gun and bomb attacks on a police 
station and a bank in Kankara, Katsina 
State. 
27 June 2011 Maiduguri (Borno 
State) 
Maiduguri (Borno 
State) 
Boko Haram's gun and bomb attacks on a 
beer garden in Maiduguri left at least 25 
dead and dozens injure 
25 August 2011 Adamawa Adamawa State Gun and bomb attacks by Boko Haram on 
two police stations and two banks in Gombi, 
Adamawa State, killed at least 16 people, 
including seven policemen. 
26 August 2011 Abuja United Nations 
Office in Abuja 
At least 23 people were killed in the United 
Nations Office in the Nigerian capital, 
Abuja. 
12 September2011 Misau Bauchi State Misau Bauchi State Seven men, including four policemen, were 
killed by Boko Haram gunmen in bomb and 
shooting attacks on a police station and a 
bank in Misau, Bauchi State.  
(continued) 
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Table 1 
Timeline of Alleged Attacks and Killings by the Boko Haram Group (continued) 
Date  Targets Description 
12 September 
2011 
Misau Bauchi State Misau Bauchi State Seven men, including four policemen, were 
killed by Boko Haram gunmen in bomb and 
shooting attacks on a police station and a 
bank in Misau, Bauchi State.  
4 November  2011 Maiduguri (Borno 
State) 
Maiduguri (Borno 
State) 
The motorcade of Borno State governor 
Kashim Shettima came under Boko Haram 
bomb attacks in Maiduguri on its way from 
the airport to the governor's residence as he 
returned from a trip to Abuja. 
4 December 2011 Azare Bauchi Bauchi A soldier, a policeman and a civilian were 
killed in bomb and gun attacks on police 
buildings and two banks in Azare, Bauchi 
State. Boko Haram opened fire at a wedding 
in Maiduguri, killing the groom and a guest. 
7 December 2011 Kaduna City Kaduna City An explosion linked to Boko Haram killed 
eight in the Oriyapata district of Kaduna city 
13 December 2011 Maiduguri (Borno 
State) 
Maiduguri (Borno 
State) 
bomb attack on a military checkpoint by 
Boko Haram and the resulting shooting by 
soldiers in Maiduguri left 10 dead and 30 
injured. 
22 December 2011 Potiskum (Yobe 
State) 
Potiskum (Yobe 
State) 
Boko Haram bombed in parts of Maiduguri 
killed 20. Four policemen and a civilian 
were killed in gun and bomb attacks on a 
police building in Potiskum, Yobe State. 
About 100 were killed following multiple 
bomb and shooting attacks by the sect's 
gunmen in ensuing gun battles with troops 
in the Pompomari outskirts of Damaturu. 
25 December 2011 Madalla, Niger State St Theresa’s 
Catholic Church 
Madalla 
39 People were killed in bomb were killed 
in the apparent suicide car bombing on 
Christmas day in St Theresa’s Catholic 
Church. 
20 January 2012 
 
Kano State Police Station, 
Immigration Offices 
Boko Haram set Kano ablaze with multiple 
bombings and shootings, which claimed 
over 128 lives. The bombings targeted eight 
police stations and immigration offices, 
including a regional police headquarters and 
the state police headquarters. 
(continued) 
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Table 1 
Timeline of Alleged Attacks and Killings by the Boko Haram Group (continued) 
23 January  2012 Kano State Kano State Kano city again came under a fresh attack as 
the Boko Haram sect bombed a police 
outpost at Sheka along Zoo road, close to 
the Shagari quarters. 
February 2012 
 
 
Jos, Plateau State Church of Christ in 
Jos 
Boko Haram bombers forced their way into 
the headquarters of the Church of Christ in 
Nigeria (COCIN) in Jos and detonated 
explosives within the church premises, 
killing eight and injuring 35 people 
07 July 13, 2013 Yobe Schools in Yobe 
state 
Boko Haram insurgent group killed 42 
people, mostly students, in an attack on a 
secondary school in restive Yobe state. 
Source: Author’s Compilation 
As can be seen in Table 1, Boko Haram attacked the Nigerian Police force on 
October 6, 2010.  The group has also carried out several bombing attacks in different 
parts of Northern Nigeria, showing that it is establishing a presence across the region and 
fueling tension between Muslims and Christians.  These attacks included (a) the military 
barracks attack on 2010 New Year’s Eve in the northeastern city of Damaturu; (b) the 
2011 Christmas Day bombings on the outskirts of Abuja; (c) the May 2011 bombing 
during Presidents Goodluck Jonathan’s inauguration, and (d) the August 2011 bombing 
of UN headquarters in Abuja, which was also Boko Haram’s first attack against a 
Western target and its only transnational attack. 
In 2012, the Ansaru sect, a Boko Haram splinter group, claimed responsibility for 
the kidnapping of foreigners in Northern Nigeria.  In January 2013, the Ansaru ambushed 
a military convoy bound for Mali, and later abducted seven foreign nationals in Bauchi, 
Nigeria on February 16, 2013 (Stratfor, 2013).  On January 20, 2013, in the city of Kano, 
the Boko Haram launched one of the nation’s deadliest assaults, leaving one 185 people 
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dead.  Boko Haram’s tactics can be broken down into the major categories of suicide 
bombings (typically using vehicle-borne explosives) and motorcycle ambushes.  
Religious worship centers, police stations, military barracks, religious leaders, and 
political institutions are all targets for Boko Haram.   
There have been wide variations and divisions in the literature over the agitations 
and desires of the Boko Haram group.  Much of Boko Haram’s indiscriminate killings of 
innocent Nigerians, including children, raise questions about any sincere purpose other 
than being an evil organization.  The changing dynamics of Boko Haram’s tactics are 
fueling speculation that it is not one group, but several.  Both the breadth and speed of its 
transformation speak of an organization moving in multiple directions all at once.  
Indeed, it appears so dynamic that it is hard to imagine all these changes being instigated 
and directed by a small group of clearly defined leaders.  It seems far more likely that it is 
a confederacy made up of broadly likeminded factions, each with its own fighters, 
leaders, agendas, and capabilities.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
A number of factors promoting violence have been identified, including the 
colonial legacy (weak central state), widespread corruption, ethnic tensions, endemic 
poverty, social frustration, oil, and unemployment.  However the evidence supports the 
weak, or failed state, hypothesis.  
Oil 
 Oil contributes more than 80% of Nigeria’s budgetary revenue and provides 95% of 
the country’s foreign exchange (2013 CIA fact sheet).  Figure 1 shows oil in Nigeria. 
 
Figure 1: Nigeria: A Nation Divided - Oil 
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As seen in Figure 1, Nigeria’s oil production in 2010 rose above 800,000,000 
barrels (Source: OPEC).  The booming oil price provides the Nigerian government with 
over 95% of its export earnings.  Oil contributes to Nigeria’s failure as a state in four 
major ways.  First, its extraction and production undermine the quality of the living 
standards of Nigerians, particularly members of the oil producing communities such as 
the Niger Delta region and those living closest to the oil wells.  Oil mining and gas 
flaring activities continue to deplete the ecosystem in this region due to lack of 
compliance with environmental standards.  The cancer rates are higher in this area than 
the national rates, and respiratory ailments are plaguing the residents.  There are 
regulations in place to protect the people, but no entity enforces them.  Laws, guidelines, 
and standards put in place over 40 years ago are consistently ignored or implemented and 
interpreted loosely, which contributes to the extensive pollution that is not cleared up as 
required.  Second, oil has helped to fuel the many insurgencies that are present in 
modern-day Nigeria.  According to Hill (2012), “one of the main reasons the movement 
for the emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) took up arms was to win justice for the 
country’s residents” (p. 66).  Third, the oil sector has incapacitated much of the rest of 
Nigeria’s economy, resulting in endemic poverty in many parts of the country.  Every 
other sector in Nigeria depends on oil and its accompanying revenue in order to function 
appropriately.  Fourth, oil proceeds are being used to sponsor insurgent groups, and much 
of the high level corruption that is taking place in the country occurs in the oil sector.  
The steady collapse of other economic sectors in Nigeria has resulted in overdependence 
on oil, which has brought untold hardships on many Nigerians.   
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There are armed groups in the Niger Delta that are interested in fighting for a fair 
distribution of the oil profits the government receives.  These groups are fighting for the 
transfer of ownership of the oil rights from the Federal Government to the citizens of the 
Niger Delta (Hill, 2012).  The Constitution states that the natural resources of the nation 
shall be used for all citizens of Nigeria.  The government has failed the Niger Delta 
region and this failure continues to infuriate the oil producing communities (The 
Economist London, 2006).  Citizens, especially the armed groups in the Niger Delta, 
want to share in the revenue from the sale of oil and are disenchanted with the conditions 
in which they live.  Measurable and significant standards must be enforced to address the 
impoverished environmental conditions, otherwise kidnappings, secessionist movements, 
and the destruction of pipelines and burning of oil wells will continue (The Guardian, 
2010).   
Oil and Widespread Corruption 
Oil revenue is facilitating the majority of the corruption in the county because it is 
the main source of the country’s exported goods and foreign earnings.  The economy is 
considered a rentier state, partly because much of the revenue comes from rents paid 
through licenses and royalties from multiple international petroleum corporations.  Rents 
collected are primarily in the hands of the central government (Falola & Heaton, 2008, p. 
183-184).  The federal government does not depend on its citizens for revenue streams; 
therefore, the citizens’ views, voices, and demands are ignored.  This high concentration 
of wealth and economic power are in the hands of only a few citizens who abuse the 
democratic system.  Some use it to influence votes and intimidate voters in the name of 
rigging elections (Hill, 2012).  Figure 1 depicts the oil and gas producing areas in 
 
 
33 
Nigeria.  The oil is produced in the southeast, and some militant groups there want to 
keep a greater share of the wealth, which comes from under their feet.  Since the proceeds 
of oil, or oil money, makes up the significant portion of the ill-gotten wealth of senior 
public figures in Nigeria, the misuse of the money has significantly watered down the 
country’s ability to wage any serious antigraft war. 
As has frequently been debated in pivotal studies of the resource curse theory, 
Nigeria appears to be a prime example of the curse that natural resources can bring (Auty 
1993; Collier & Hoeffler 2001; Le Billon 2001; Sachs & Warner 2001).  It is sad enough 
that over 50 years of substantial oil production have not resulted in any meaningful 
sustainable socioeconomic development in Nigeria, which has an extreme poverty rate. 
However, the research findings did not confirm the underlying hypothesis that 
regions with greater resource extraction, such as oil, experience higher levels of violent-
extremism and insurgency.  On the contrary, there is relative peace in the oil producing 
region of southern Nigeria.  The erstwhile insurgent group, Movement for the 
emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), in the oil producing region of the Niger Delta 
shunned hostilities against the government, and embraced peace with the amnesty 
program offered them on August 6, 2009 according to the Guardian Newspaper August 6, 
2009 (Rice, 2009).  Though oil remains essential to Nigeria’s economy and stability, 
there is no substantial influence of oil on the present occurrence of violent extremism and 
insurgencies in Northern Nigeria.  This is dissimilar to the resource-curse theory, which 
links the occurrence of violent conflicts to natural resources.  On the other hand, 
mismanagement of Nigeria’s oil wealth and the visible deprivation of social and human 
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capital in Northern Nigeria serve as a catalyst for the exponential rise of violent 
extremism and insurgency in the country.   
Poverty and Social Frustration 
High rates of poverty directly promote violence in Northern Nigeria.  As a result, 
many impoverished, disenfranchised, and young, devout Muslims are becoming 
increasingly skeptical about a system that has brought them little benefits and has well 
served the interests of the established political elite (Isaacs, 2003).  The absences of 
sustainable independent institutions to perform checks and balances of the elites in 
government have prolonged the socioeconomic and political development of the country.  
These independent institutions would be responsible for moderating public and 
governmental decisions that affect the citizens.  Weakened institutions with no 
democratic philosophy have contributed to poor governance (Migdal, 1988). 
According to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Business and Rules in 
Nigeria, Senator Ita Enang, “eighty-three percent of Nigerian oil blocks are owned by 
Northerners” (Thisday Newspaper, Mar 7, 2013, para. 2).  He urged the National 
Assembly to revoke and reallocate the nation’s oil blocks for equitable distribution of 
wealth in the country.  Though the northerners own much of the oil blocks in Nigeria, this 
has not improved the lives of the majority of northerners.   
Notwithstanding billions of oil revenue, Nigeria does not make responsible 
decisions for the citizens.  Only half of Nigeria’s population has access to electricity. 
According to Table 2, the living standards for the majority of Nigerians have 
slightly changed since 1970, and approximately 100 million citizens are living on less 
than one dollar a day (Campbell & Bunche, 2011).  The poverty level consistently 
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increases, as shown in Table 2.  Life in Nigeria is not easy for many of its citizens, 
especially those in the North.   
Table 2 
Nigeria’s population in Poverty 
Year Population 
1980 17.1 million 
1985 34.7 million 
1992 39.2 million 
1996 67.1 million 
2004 68.7 million 
2010 112.47 million 
Source: Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics (2012)  
The evidence does not fully confirm the underlying hypotheses that regions with 
higher levels of abject poverty will experience the highest level of extremism.  Though 
poverty is generally pervasive in most developing countries, evidence in the research 
shows it is not the leading cause of violent-extremism and insurgency in Nigeria. 
Colonial Legacy 
Most of the problems facing Nigeria can be traced to the country’s colonial 
heritage.  Nigeria is a deeply divided country, largely stemming from the many ethnic 
groups that inhabit the country.  This has halted the advancement of development across 
the country.  In precolonial times, there were various opportunities for intermingling 
through commercial contact using waterways and caravan trade routes, through 
intermarriages, and through wars of conquest.  The diverse setting allowed inconsistent 
colonial rule that further hampered attempts to develop Nigeria comprehensively.  Bello 
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(1962), stated, “in spite of Nigeria’s common colonial experience, the record also 
emphasized the local differences in administrative practices going right back to the early 
years of this century.  Up to May 1906, the British authorities had totally different 
administrative structures to the east, west, and north of the Niger.”  Europeans commonly 
used the divide-and-conquer principles that led the way to constant shifting of 
relationships between rulers and collaborators. 
Nigeria today is drastically divided along ethnic lines due to the colonial 
influences and greed for power.  Before the British rule, Nigeria was more stable than it 
is today.  Leadership from a strong centralized force was needed in the country to keep it 
united with all of the ethnic divisions amongst the many ethnic groups.  This leadership 
emerged when the military became sufficiently powerful to keep the country together, 
which led to other, larger, problems (Osaghae, 1998).   
Weak State Structure 
The term “weak state” describes states whose governments have weakened to an 
extent that they are unable to provide basic public goods, such as security, health care, 
and legitimate institutions for their people (Wyler, 2007).  The Nigerian government’s 
inability to perform the basic functions of a state, such as ensuring peace and stability 
within its borders, qualifies it to be a weak state.  Weak states can threaten the progress 
and stability of other countries.  The decisions a country with a weak state makes have 
inadvertent domestic and international consequences.  Migdal (1988) provided the 
following characteristics of a weak state: 
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 Low levels of legitimacy  
  Low capacity of independent analyses of their own development problems along 
with designing adequate strategies 
  Low capabilities to collect taxes and spend government revenue in planned 
manner 
  Administrative capacity insufficient to implement decisions taken along with 
policies adopted by the government 
  Limited influence on the pattern of societal development within the country 
Nigeria exhibits severe weaknesses that allow vulnerability to natural disasters, 
war, and economic deprivation.  Unfortunately, other nations view Nigeria as a 
crumbling and fading enterprise and has been for over three decades.  The government is 
limited and very few public goods and services are provided to its citizens along with 
protection from the law.   
The research evidence shows the state-failure theory does confirm the underlying 
hypotheses that regions where the central government does not have the capacity to 
police the region effectively and provide public services will experience higher levels of 
violent extremism.  The central authority in Nigeria still lacks combative measures to 
curtail the menace of violent extremism and insurgency.  Though the Nigerian state 
appears to be one piece, its people, particularly the northerners, are not at peace.  
Nigeria’s future may be hanging in the balance with the increasing tide of violence and 
insurgence in its northern region. 
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FMSO Report 2013 by Oluwatosin Babalola 
Media Effect On Boko Haram Crisis In Northern Nigeria 
This section is devoted to the Foreign Students Military Office (FMSO) report, 
and it analyzes the effects of local and international media reports on the Boko Haram 
crisis in Nigeria. What are the impacts of local and international media on violent 
extremism and insurgency in Nigeria and what are the implications of extremist violence 
on the future of Nigeria? Though both local and international media agree that Boko 
Haram’s method have become increasingly sophisticated and audacious over the years, 
they differ significantly on the group’s affiliation with foreign terrorists such as al-Qaeda. 
According to a US Congressional report that was released in November 2011, “Boko 
haram may be forging ties with al-Qaeda linked groups in Africa” (BBC News Africa, 
January 11, 2012, p. 2). After the bombing of United Nations Office in Abuja by the 
Boko Haram sect on August 26 2011 which killed dozens of people, Martin Plaut, an 
African analyst for the BBC News reported that, “the commander of the US Africa 
Command, General Carter Ham said he had several sources of information that Boko 
Haram had contacts with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which operates in north-west 
Africa” (BBC News, August 26, 2011, p. 2). Most international media argued that the 
expertise involved in the waves of attacks carried out by Boko Haram further suggests it 
affiliation with larger terrorists groups such as al-Qaeda. 
 On the other hand, local media reports in Nigeria debunked Boko Haram’s 
affiliation with al-Qaeda and described it as a “local terror group”. Rather they argue that 
the Nigerian government has vested interest in affiliating Boko Haram with larger 
terrorist organization such as al-Qaeda in order to merit and attract the sympathy of 
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international community. Adibe (2012a) argued that “linking Boko Haram to al Qaeda 
will blunt criticisms against Nigeria government’s inability to contain the group- after all 
if the USA and European countries, with all their resources and capabilities have not been 
able to effectively contain al Qaeda, why will anyone see it as a sign of weakness that the 
government has not been able to defeat an organization and its sponsors?” (Adibe, 
2012a). The local media portrays Boko as an Islamic militia that has taken up arms 
against the government in pursuit of an Islamic state and other religious motivated 
objectives.  According to the US Commission on International Religious Freedom 
(USCIRF), “Boko Haram had become primary perpetrator of religiously- related and 
gross freedom violations in Nigeria” (Vanguard Newspapers, August 21, 2013, para. 2).  
Boko Haram attacks churches, people perceived to be Christians, Muslim critics and 
every other person deemed un-Islamic. The media in Nigeria portrays Boko Haram as a 
homegrown insurgent group that exploits the weakness and pervasive failure of the 
Nigerian government to exercise control over its territory. 
Furthermore, some local media in Nigeria have linked endemic poverty and 
hopelessness in northern Nigeria to intra-state violence caused by Boko Haram. The lack 
of economic opportunities and inequalities are also responsible for the surge in violent-
extremism in northern Nigeria. According to the former U.S. President Bill Clinton, 
Nigeria’s challenge of terrorism in the north is being fuelled by extreme poverty that 
increases by the day (Ekott, 2013). However, the international media has a different 
dimension to the cause of the violence in Nigeria. Jean Herskovits (a professor of history 
at the State University of New York) argued that the main problem in Nigeria is not Boko 
Haram but the Nigerian government‘s insensitivity to the people. He contends that “since 
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Nigeria’s return to civil rule in 1999, many politicians have used ethnic and regional 
differences, and most disastrously, religion for their own purposes” (Herskovits, 2012). 
Nigerians are indeed desperate for a responsive government that will guarantee security 
and welfare of the people. It is a widely held belief that many youths in northern Nigeria 
are outraged over the regions neglect and endemic poverty.  
The international media firmly believes that Boko Haram group enjoys the 
backing of some officials within President’s Jonathan’s government and security 
agencies. According to President Jonathan, “of the Boko Haram sympathizers, some of 
them are in the executive arm of government, some of them are in the parliamentary/ 
legislative arm of the government, while some of them are even in the judiciary, armed 
forces, the police and other security agencies” (BBC News, January 8, 2012, para. 6). 
Similarly, the local media affirms Boko Haram enjoys the support of many influential 
Nigerians. ). These influential Nigerians include Alhaji Buji Fai, an ex-commissioner in 
Borno State, who was murdered after his arrest in 2009, Kadiru Atiku, a former 
university lecturer; and Bunu Wakil, a Borno-based contractor- they are all known to be 
members of the sect (Onuoha, 2012). Much of the supports given to the group by 
Nigerians are religiously motivated, which attracted the sympathy of local men, women 
and children in northern Nigeria. Other speculated sponsors include influential northern 
religious leaders and politicians (Sani, 2011).  
Both the local and international media agree that the Boko Haram sect is more 
audacious and sophisticated in their acts of terror against the Nigerian state. Boko Haram 
militants are using more sophisticated military tactics and ammunitions, which make 
them more dangerous to the people. The increasing spate of killings and bombings in 
 
 
41 
some parts of northern Nigeria is illustrative of the sustained weakness of the Nigerian 
government to exercise control within its territory.  In the absence of capable and strong 
institutions, such as robust armed forces, committed religious and political leaders, Boko 
Haram exploits the weakness of the Nigerian state and enjoys the loyalty of disaffected 
youths in northern Nigeria. “They exploit the porosity of Nigerian borders and lackluster 
security apparatus in the country to smuggle arms and sophisticated ammunition to 
destabilize the state (Onapajo & Uzodike 2012).  
Since 2009, Boko Haram group have attacked several churches, mosques police 
stations, prisons and other government establishments across northern Nigeria, killing 
over 3,000 people in more than 700 attacks. They have also attacked, kidnapped, and 
killed foreigners for huge ransoms within the country. With scores of changing tactics 
and strategies, the Boko Haram sect appears resilient even as the Nigerian government 
reacts with brute use of military force and countless arrests of its members. The Boko 
Haram crisis negatively impacts the social and economic development of northern 
Nigeria as many business and offices have moved out of the affected areas. 
From the research findings, the media appears divided on the methods, changing 
tactics of terror, and the alliance of Boko Haram with larger terrorists groups, particularly 
al-Qaeda. The implications of not curbing the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria threaten the 
unity and socio-economic well-being of one of Africa’s largest democracy. The Nigerian 
government has to become responsive to the needs of the citizens and reform the weak 
institutions to help overcome the challenges of extremism and insurgency in the country. 
The unity of Nigeria must be preserved, as it is a reputable and strategic ally of the 
foreign policy interests of the United States of America in Africa.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
This section evaluates some measures already taken by the Nigerian government 
in tackling the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria. It also suggests possible solutions that will 
help curb the menace of violent extremism and insurgency in Nigeria. In the past, the 
Nigerian government has resolved to the use of brute military force against insurgent 
groups and deployed over 8000 troops into affected parts of northern Nigeria with no 
clearly defined Military Code of Justice for the operation. An example of an unclear 
military objective executed by the Nigerian Army is the mindless killing and invasion of 
Baga community in Borno state on Sunday, April 21, 2013. The Nigerian soldiers in a 
single operation killed over 200 civilians suspected to members of the Boko Haram sect 
in the aftermath of an attack.  With countless arrests and killings of innocent civilians, 
suspected members and sponsors of the Boko Haram group, tensions continue to escalate 
with no sign of abating in troubled parts of northern Nigeria.  
The Nigerian government also considered the option of dialogue with the 
members of the Boko Haram sect but this opportunity has not being carefully harnessed. 
According to a Rand report that made systematic examination and comparison of 268 
groups using terror tactics from 1968 to 2006, several approaches have been shown to be 
much more effective than mere reliance on military responses at eliminating future 
attacks.  This approach includes criminal justice responses and other attempts to address 
the well-being concerns of both combatants and the broader populace that might support 
them.  The study revealed that 40% of the 268 groups were eliminated through 
intelligence and policing methods; 43% ended their violence as a result of peaceful 
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political accommodation; 10 % ceased their violent activity because they had achieved 
their objectives (“victory”) by violence; and only 7% were defeated militarily. Refer to 
Figure 2 for effective methods used against terror attacks.  
 
Figure 2: Successful Methods Used Against Terror Tactics 1968-2006.  Source: Rand Report 2008 
 
Military responses have often created more extensive violent response and 
terrorism against the civilian population caught between the two opposing forces.  In 
addition, wars often create the conditions for additional violent conflicts over the new 
resources and new political alignments created by an initial invasion or occupation.  The 
civil wars and criminal violence that erupted in both Iraq and Afghanistan are examples 
of this phenomenon. 
In the Nigerian case of combating extremism, military necessity cannot be 
underestimated to quell terrorism, given the escalating incidence of terror attacks in the 
country.  However, over-reliance on the use of force on the government’s part appears to 
be a shortcut to sustainable peace and security in the affected region.  General Carter 
Ham, Commander of the United States African Command (AFRICOM), has cautioned 
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African governments not to rely solely on the use of excessive military force to fight the 
war against terror in Africa.  He said that “though there is perhaps some necessity for 
some military action, the solution lies in the non-military solution and activities that 
would address the underlying causes of the dissatisfactions which include good 
governance” (Onuorah, Guardian Newspaper, February 1, 2013).  Ultimately, the 
continuous use of military force seems preferable in dousing the tension of extremism in 
Nigeria, but protracted military effort is not going to eradicate the long-term problem, as 
this is capable of leading Nigeria to yet another civil war.  It has been proven that violent 
extremism and insurgents thrive in an environment charged with hopelessness. The 
Nigerian government needs to be more responsive to the socioeconomic well-being of the 
people, and further engage systematic means of mediating disputes without recourse to 
the protracted use of armed insurrection. 
The Nigeria government needs to carry out structural reforms that will further 
strengthen the nation’s weak institutions. The nation’s armed forces need to be developed 
to higher capacity such that can protect and defend the sovereignty of the country.  The 
nation’s armed forces need to pay more respect to the citizen’s right to live and adopt a 
clear military objective which provides adequate protection for the civilian population. 
Furthermore, the Nigerian government needs to adopt traditional approaches to conflict 
resolution which is more cost effective to the government than the brute use of force. The 
government can take advantage of the culturally rich traditional approach to peace 
making and nation-building to end the crisis.  
Lastly Nigerians need to rise above the challenges of ethnic polarization and 
embrace the strength in the country’s diversity. Nigerians need to accept the 
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responsibility of breaking away from the shackles of ethnic differences which has held 
the country spell bound for so many years. There is an urgent need for the government to 
become more pro-active in all features of conflict management and guarantee the well-
being of all Nigerians regardless of ethnic plurality. 
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